I. Introduction
In orthodox theory an agent is described by his endowment, tastes and technological production possibilities which are open to him. One does not enquire how these characteristics of the agent came to be what they are, nor, in general, does one allow the characteristics to be affected by the economic environment. The characteristics are arbitrarily given by the history of the economy and of the agent and so, for instance, there are many equilibria depending on the characteristics. In particular if the total endowment of goods is given, any allocation of these between agents (in a pure exchange economy), will be an equilibrium for some tastes and endowment distribution. There does not seem to me anything wrong with the conclusion that equilibria are not history free (they are not independent of initial conditions). Indeed one may adduce rather strong arguments to support the view that history free theorems in the Social Sciences are bogus. To say that the equilibrium set depends on history is not to make equilibrium theory vacuous, the reverse is the case. For one is thereby taking the view that empirical evidence is required to generate interesting propositions. The relevance of these remarks to what follows will be seen below.
The orthodox description of the agent is however incomplete on several counts. The most important omission concerns the information available to the agent. For instance if one considers the set of all physical objects in an economy a partition of this set will define the goods which one agent can distinguish. The partition may differ between agents and need not be independent of economic signals. One need only think of second-hand motor cars or different qualities of labour to see that an assumption that all agents have identical fine partitions is not satisfactory. Pari passu the same remarks apply to the partitioning of states of nature; see Radner (1968) . A great deal of work has recently been undertaken mainly in the context of very simple models, to study the consequences of enriching the agent's description by endowing him with an information structure and taking account of the possibility that this structure may be only partly a characteristic, i.e. may in part at least depend on economic events (e.g. Rothschild, 1974) .
Related to this is the observation that agents have, in general, to deduce their economic environment from the signals which they receive. Thus in orthodox theory the agent does not know the production possibility set of the economy but only relative prices. One of the beautiful aspects of the theory is that this is all he needs to know. Yet even in this simple orthodox world there is a theoretical lacuna: there is no description in terms of the decisions of agents of how prices come to be what they are. It is true that there is a very special account of exchange processes between agents which terminate in allocations which can be supported by competitive prices. But that is hardly satisfactory although even such special constructions may be superior to the auctioneer. For most markets it is simply the case that the description of the agent and of the signals which he receives is not rich enough for a theory of price formation by the agents. I have now come to the central issues to be studied in this paper. Since they are easy to misunderstand I shall discuss them further before introducing technicalities.
The proposal to study an economy which is sufficiently well described to answer the question: "why are the signals received by agents what they are?" is not at all to embark on "dynamics", except in a very weak sense. The weak sense is that an equilibrium must be recognizable as a stationary state of a dynamic system, the finer characteristics of which may be unknown. For instance, in the orthodox tatonnement matters are normally too complicated to give a precise account of the evolution of prices from a given starting point. But the dynamic equations induce the definition of an equilibrium as stationary points. If the auctioneer is replaced by the agents who change the prices at which they are willing to trade whenever they consider this to be profitable then the stationary point of the dynamic system will have to be a set of signals at which agents do not see profits to be made by changing price. The set of stationary points or equilibria may include those of the tatonnement but clearly need not coincide with the set of equilibria of the latter. I am making the obvious point that the states which we designate as equilibria cannot be independent of the theory of how signals and allocations change. The underlying axiom of the Arrow-Debreu theory is that (at positive prices), prices are stationary iff target excess demand is everywhere zero. If this assumption is changed, and nothing else in the description of the economy is changed, we may expect to find states which previously did not, and now do, qualify as equilibrium states.
At prices which are not in the stationary set of prices for a tatonnement it is true by definition that not all agents can carry out their intended transactions. One postulates that this gives rise to a further set of signals which tell some of the agents that the transactions which are open to them at these prices are restricted in size. One now requires a theory or rule of the generation of such quantity signals (e.g. a "rationing scheme"), and one requires a theory of the agents' adjustments to these signals. It is in this second stage that one needs the notion of conjectures. If we include in the actions of an agent not only the amounts of each good which he wishes to trade but also the prices which he will announce as those at which he is willing to trade then in the first instance we are looking for a correspondence from the signals received by an agent to the set of actions he conjectures to be available to him. Call it the action correspondence. The equilibrium notion is fairly clear: it is signals received by agents such that the best action for each in the set of possible actions again induces the original signals. A formal definition is found below. Such an equilibrium I want to call a conjectural equilibrium.
I can now return to my opening paragraph. Certainly in the above description of a conjectural equilibrium the designated equilibrium states depend on the conjectures with which we have endowed the agents-e.g. their beliefs of the relation there might be between their ration and their announced price. But the conjectures are unexplained and to that extent conjectural equilibria appear to be arbitrary. As a first reply one is tempted to say that this is no different from the arbitrary tastes of orthodoxy. Certainly this is not entirely unjustified. But there is an objection to this, namely that it may be more convincing to believe that there is no clear inducement to discover which are "correct" tastes. I am not at all sure that this objection has much force. A person brought up on hamburgers may continue with this unpleasing diet even if it is the case that if he tried fish and chips he would discover that he preferred that. Just in the same way a person may continue to find himself unemployed ever so often at a given wage and conjecture wrongly that he can do nothing about it by proposing a lower wage and never undertake the experiment which would reveal this mistake. The belief of the orthodox that given sufficient time men discover their true environment suggests a certain ignorance of both anthropology and history. Children were sacrificed for good harvests for centuries and many people believe that the quantity of money determines the level of money income. Both are wrong conjectures.
That conjectures may be the outcome of past experience and that they may be "given" for the theorist and discoverable by empirical enquiry is to me acceptable. It is a view which decisively divides both Keynesians and Marxists from orthodoxy. The world is to be explained at least partly by the way agents perceive it and the way in which they perceive it is partly for history, partly for sociology, and partly for psychology. To the orthodox perception does not enter in the story. That is of course why they are so sanguine about the working of the invisible hand.
Nonetheless the orthodox pose an interesting problem when they suggest that the arbitrariness of conjectures be removed by the requirement that they be "correct". As we shall see that requirement is not unambiguously defined and may be impossible to satisfy. In what follows I shall be mainly concerned with that problem. Let firm i observe the price vector p ER1+, the demand xi and a labour ration Li0 <0. The latter is a signal that firm i must choose its production at p from Yifn {y Iy y Lo >Li}. We stipulate The definition is straightforward. Of course the economy considered is somewhat special in particular in insisting that households are endowed with competitive conjectures. In the sequel I shall follow tradition and not ask that these conjectures of households correspond to what is the case. Now the profit functions ,( *) embody the conjectures of firms and at the moment are arbitrary up to 7t.1-n7.4. In studying the notion of rational conjectures it will be as well not to be too ambitious at the outset. In particular I shall start with considering the possibility of imposing local restrictions on conjectures.
II. A Simple Conjectural Economy
To do this I need to define a conjectural equilibrium relatively to the production of firm i. Let I use the terminology 'reasonable' to distinguish the case where a firm may be right in its belief that it cannot locally improve profits for the 'wrong' reason from that where the firm is right in that belief for the 'right' reason (which I shall call 'rational'). Thus a firm may wrongly predict the relevant elements of E( *-) and yet be correct in its conclusion that it cannot improve itself by small changes in production. A more stringent requirement is that in a conjectural equilibrium each firm i should correctly predict the element of ,(p, xi, Lfo, y) where (p, xl, . .., XH, Lo, y) E Ei(yi, y?).
Thus in an e-rational conjectural equilibrium not only is there no other conjectural equilibrium consistent with yiE N(y, e) in which i's profits are higher than they are in the given equilibrium, but the profits attained in any conjectural equilibrium relatively to y, are those which i's conjectures predict.
Both of the definitions of e-reasonable and 8-rational conjectural equilibrium are in the general equilibrium spirit and it may be thought that they are too demanding even before one has considered the problem of their existence. So let me consider one last alternative formulation which is more in the spirit of Nash equilibria.
Let Thus in an e-Nash deviation we calculate the equilibrium of the economy on the supposition that all firms other than i keep their productions as it is in conjectural equilibrium and therefore ignore the fact that this constancy of production may not be profit maximising for these firms under their conjectures. One may say that this is an interesting concept either because no firm i could calculate anything more elaborate or, more speculatively that for a small enough firm i at e, the e-Nash deviation is a good approximation to an e-conjectural equilibrium relatively to y,. One now has D.2.6. The conjectural equilibrium (pO, x], ..., Lg, y?) is e-Nash rational if for all i and yie Yi,n N(e, y,) there exists an c-Nash deviation relatively to i such that
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That is, in an e-Nash rational conjectural equilibrium the conjectural profit functions of firms correctly predict the profits to be made from an e-Nash deviation.
We now have a good many candidates for tying down conjectures. One wants to ask two questions: (i) are there good economic grounds for supposing conjectural equilibria to have one or more of the characteristics captured by E-reasonable, 8-rational and e-Nash rational? and (ii) are all of these equilibria non-vacuous-that is, could they exist? Until we have explored (ii) it is not worthwhile arguing about (i).
III. Existence Problems
Given the assumptions in Section II one can show that a conjectural equilibrium exists1 and I shall here take this for granted. To proceed to the next task it will be convenient to simplify the model in the non-essential way of letting firms have competitive conjectures in the labour market. That is we now remove the quantity signals Lio from the profit functions. I shall also suppose that a conjectural equilibrium with Po >0 exists and henceforth, without change of notation, take po=-1 in p. Lastly I postulate that all functions that interest me are of class C2. These two conditions must be satisfied if the conjectural equilibrium is to be e-rational. But now suppose the common utility function to be CobbDouglas with exponents oci (i= 1, 2). Then 3.9 becomes kpXi,[Xl The examples suggest that there will be considerable difficulty in describing an economy with simple enough conjectures which also possesses an e-rational equilibrium. My present view is that the conditions will turn out to be sufficiently restrictive to make the result uninteresting. But there is another lesson which seems important.
In the examples I gave conjectures a particular form. Now if one takes e small enough what one is roughly concerned with is the existence of an equilibrium where the conjectured slope of the inverse demand curve at the equilibrium output accurately predicts the price in an equilibrium relatively to a very small deviation in a producer's output. But as we have seen this will depend not only on the conjectured slopes of other producers but also on their rates of change (the terms hp, hy). In the examples, in trying to discover whether conjectured slopes can be 'tied down' by asking that they be 'correct' in a proper sense we made these higher order terms arbitrary. So even had our conclusion been positive we should have shown that there exists an equilibrium in which conjectured slopes are 'correct' only at the cost of arbitrarily imposing a form on the conjectured demand function. Indeed I think that under fairly general assumptions one may be able to show that there always exists a conjectural equilibrium with "correct" slopes provided one can arbitrarily specify the form of the conjecture. But this means that we do not escape the arbitrariness of conjectures.
Evidently there are quite hard technical problems and they require further investigation. But I think there is enough evidence in this section to warrant the preliminary conclusion that e-rationality is not a hopeful way of avoiding the arbitrariness-i.e. the exogenous, nature of conjectures.
IV. Nash e-Rationality I shall be brief in this section for the matter requires more investigation than I can give it here. Indeed I shall only consider an example of 1 =2. Suppose that (p?, y?) is a conjectural equilibrium and consider a small e deviation from y?l by producer one. We are in the first instance interested in the equilibria (if they exist), relatively to that deviation on the supposition that the output of producer two stays at yo. Notice that such equilibria will not in general be conjectural equilibria since producer two will not be maximising relatively to his conjectures. Now p will be an equilibrium relatively to ( Once again it is rather doubtful that one can find sufficiently general conditions which would ensure the existence of an e-Nash rational conjectural equilibrium. But this is a matter for further study.
V. Some Conclusions
To a practical economist it will be no surprise that the notions of rationality in conjectures explored here are very unpromising. Indeed he would argue that the questions are incorrectly formulated. For either the typical firm is 'small' and hence one should ignore the general equilibrium repercussions of its own actions or it is significant in which case the proper approach is either game theoretic or a rule of thumb.
There evidently is some force in this objection. On the other hand unless a firm is so small (strictly of measure zero), as to make a perfectly competitive conjecture e-rational in my sense, it will make mistakes when it acts on a conjectured demand curve derived from partial equilibrium hypotheses. By this I mean that it correctly calculates the slope of the demand curve on the hypothesis that all other prices and outputs other than its own are fixed. The question of course is whether these mistakes are small enough to be 'sensibly' ignored.
With sufficient assumptions (which certainly must exclude the CobbDouglas utility function) one can almost certainly establish the existence of a "Marshallian e-conjectural equilibrium". That would be an equilibrium in which producers have chosen optimally relatively to observed demand and price and have correctly calculated the slope of their demand curve at this point on the assumption that all other prices and outputs remain constant. There will be some technical difficulties since one will not be sure without special hypotheses that conjectural profit functions are concave everywhere. But there certainly is a class of utility for which this will be true. Such equilibria will not be e-reasonable or 8-rational. Hence in an actual experiment a firm may discover that it is mistaken. Depending on cross-elasticities these mistakes may be 'large' for a 'small' firm.
All of this requires further study and the present paper is no more than an introduction to some of the questions which arise. My present view is that if it will prove possible to make conjectures less arbitrary it will have to be done in a Marshallian way. This is not a conclusion congenial to a general equilibrium man. 
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